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T
he telecommunications sector has experienced a spectacular decline
from mid-2000 until the present, after experiencing a spectacular rise
from early 1997. Equity valuations and capital spending soared and
then plummeted, and a ﬂood of initial public offerings turned into a ﬂood of
bankruptcy ﬁlings. The boom and bust in telecommunications coincided with
the boom and bust in the U.S. equity market as a whole and with the “dot-
com bubble” of Internet stocks. The dot-coms received most of the publicity
initially,butthetelecommunicationsindustryaccountsforamuchlargershare
of market capitalization gained and lost than do the dot-coms.1 This article
documents the telecom boom and bust, and contends that it was caused by a
combination of major changes in the regulatory landscape and rapid techno-
logical progress. Both factors made it difﬁcult for telecommunications ﬁrms
and outside investors to accurately forecast supply and demand conditions in
the industry.2
Thesinglemostimportanttelecommunicationsregulatorychangeinrecent
years was the TelecommunicationsAct of 1996. ThisAct was meant to bring
competition to the local exchange carrier level, that is local telephone service.
By 1996, long-distance telephone service had a signiﬁcant amount of com-
petition, whereas local service was largely monopolized by the regional Bell
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operating companies, such as Bell Atlantic and Southwestern Bell. On the
technological side, passage of the 1996Act coincided with advances in ﬁber-
optictechnologythatdramaticallyincreasedthecapacityfordatatransmission
and with more efﬁcient use of the spectrum available for wireless communi-
cation. This was also a time of rapidly increasing Internet use. Growth of the
Internet alone meant greater demand for telecommunications services. The
combinationofimprovingtechnologyfordatatransmissionandthepossibility
ofaderegulatedmarketfortelecommunicationsservicesheldoutthepotential
that providers would be able to compete for all of a household’s or ﬁrm’s tele-
com needs. The conﬂuence of these factors led to the tremendous investment
surge and high stock valuations that were the hallmark of the telecom boom.3
Within four years of its passage, however, the Act’s initial promise had
faded. A series of legal battles had ushered in tremendous uncertainty about
the industry’s future. By early 2001, it became apparent that massive overin-
vestmenthadtakenplaceinthesector, particularlyintheareaoflong-distance
ﬁber-opticcable. Stockpricesplungedandinvestmentcollapsed. Theseprob-
lems were exacerbated by the U.S. economy’s swing into recession early in
2001, and the telecommunications sector remains in a slump to this day.
We do not subscribe to the view held by many, that the boom and bust in
the telecommunications industry represented a bubble that burst.4 According
to this view, telecom equity prices were high because people believed they
would be high in the future, though there was no expectation of high future
dividends. In turn, high equity prices drove the high levels of investment in
the industry. Then, when the belief collapsed, equity prices and investment
collapsed (the bubble burst). With the beneﬁt of hindsight, it is clear that
telecom equity prices and levels of capital spending were “too high” in the
late 1990s. However, high equity prices and high investment seem to have
beenbasedonbeliefsaboutfuturefundamentals,notsimplyontheexpectation
that prices would rise in the future. We are also skeptical about the view that
WorldCom can be blamed for the industry’s ﬂuctuations.
Already much has been written about the ﬂuctuations in the telecommu-
nications industry around the turn of the 21st century. We look forward to
thorough analyses of this episode in the years to come. Our purpose in this
article is to document some basic facts about what happened in the telecom-
munications industry, and to propose an explanation for those facts. The
facts alone make for an impressive tale. In addition, we hope that a tentative
3 Firms seem to have viewed the prospect of offering a broad range of telecommunications
services (being a “single provider”) as carrying with it high proﬁt margins. This raises interesting
questions: Are consumers willing to pay higher prices to a single provider? Are there production
efﬁciencies in being a single provider?
4A Google search on “telecom bubble” yields 1,860 hits. One might think that any two-word
phrase would yield hundreds of hits when typed into Google. This is not true: “textile bubble”
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understanding of what drove the telecommunications boom and bust can help
inform policymaking in the immediate future.
1. THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY IN THE
UNITED STATES
For our purposes, telecommunications services will refer to two-way trans-
mission of information (to include voice, text, audio, and video) “between
parties that are not in physical contact with each other” (Cave, Majumdar,
and Vogelsang, 2002, 3). Consumers purchase these services from telephone
companies, which include local, long-distance, wireless, and cable, and from
Internet providers. The divisions between these categories are increasingly
blurred, with many companies providing more than one of the services. The
blurring of divisions between different telecommunications services is, like
the boom and bust, related to technological and regulatory changes. As the
provisionoftelecommunicationsserviceshasbecomelessmonopolizedinthe
years since the breakup ofAT&T, ﬁrms producing intermediate service inputs
also have begun to play an important role in the industry.5
Telephone services include local and long distance, wireless, and related
services such as voice mail, caller ID, and directory assistance. Local tele-
phone service was originally provided by a single ﬁrm in each area, a regional
Bell, or GTE. These ﬁrms are referred to as incumbent local exchange car-
riers, or ILECs. Since the 1996 Act, long-distance companies and local en-
trants known as competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) have begun to
compete with the incumbents for the local market.6 The technology for both
the incumbents and the entrants consists of the copper local loop (the portion
of the lines connecting directly to the house or business), a ﬁber network for
longer-distancetransmission,andswitchingfacilitiesthatroutecallsalongthe
network. The technology also includes facilities for providing other services,
such as voice mail, alongside basic local service. Recently, cable companies
have used their existing networks to provide phone service.
Since the breakup of AT&T in 1984, long-distance service has been
provided primarily by a few large companies (such asAT&T, Sprint, or MCI)
and many resellers. The 1996 Act conditionally opened the long-distance
market to ILECs, and since then several of them have entered the market.
Wireless service was originally organized by the FCC as a duopoly. The
FCC reserved one license for the incumbent local exchange carrier and auc-
tioned the other. When the FCC auctioned rights to previously restricted parts
5 On the industry’s historical evolution in the United States, see Brock’s chapter in Cave et
al. (2002). Other chapters in that book also have been tremendously helpful to us in researching
this article.
6 Prior to 1996, four states had ﬁrms competing against the ILECs, but these accounted for
only a small share of telecom revenues.4 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 1 Nasdaq Telecommunications and Composite Indices
Note: End of week close. Normalized to April 4, 1997 = 100.
Source: Bloomberg
ofthespectrumin1995,manyotherﬁrmsenteredthemarket; manyareasnow
offer a choice of several wireless companies. Recently, wireless has become




and other providers such as AOL. Dial-up access, which still accounts for
roughly 70 percent of the market (Noguchi 2003), allows users to connect to
the Internet through the phone lines. Digital subscriber line (DSL) service
also travels over the local loop, but is much faster than dial-up access. This
serviceismostcommonlyofferedbytheILEC,butanycompanycanpurchase
capacity from the incumbents on a wholesale basis to resell to consumers.
CLECs currently have a 20-percent market share in digital subscriber line
service (Fitchard 2002). Cable companies also offer high-speed service over
theirownnetworksinsomeareas, andthishasbeenmorewidelyadoptedthan
DSL.BothDSLandcablearecommonlyreferredtoasbroadbandconnections.E.A. Couper, J.P. Hejkal, andA.L. Wolman: Telecom Boom and Bust 5
Finally, wireless Internet services have recently gained popularity, offering
access at home or at other locations with transmitters, such as coffee shops or
airports.
Asigniﬁcantpartofthetelecommunicationssectornowconsistsofservice
wholesalers. These ﬁrms, such as Global Crossing and Level 3, constructed
long-haulﬁbernetworksinthe1990sinthehopesofsellingcapacitytotelecom
retailers and selling ﬁnal services to large ﬁrms with high telecom demand.
2. QUANTIFYING THE BOOMAND BUST
From April 1997 to March 2000, the Nasdaq index of telecommunications
stocks rose spectacularly, from 198 to 1,230, an average annual increase of
approximately 84 percent. As of May 16, 2003, the index stood at 136, an
average annual decrease of approximately 50 percent since March 2000. To
put these ﬁgures in perspective, the Nasdaq Composite Index rose and fell at
respective annual rates of 61 percent and 32 percent over the same periods.
Figure 1 displays a plot of the time series for the Nasdaq telecommunications
and composite indices over this period, with both series normalized so that
April 4, 1997, equals 100.
Equity price behavior illustrates the telecom boom and bust most vividly,
but the evolution of the sector’s investment spending, employment, and prof-
itabilityisalsodramatic. Incontrast,increasesintheconsumptionoftelecom-
munications services and the price of local phone service, and decreases in
the price of long-distance phone service have all been gradual.
From the ﬁrst quarter of 1996 to the fourth quarter of 2000, investment in
communications equipment grew from approximately $62 billion per year to
over $135 billion per year in constant 1996 dollars (Figure 2). This represents
average annual growth of nearly 18 percent. Since the ﬁnal quarter of 2000,
year-over-year communications investment growth was negative for seven
straight quarters. In terms of investment levels, the low point came in quarter
four of 2001, at under $93 billion—only 69 percent of the same ﬁgure one
year earlier. As a percentage of total private investment, communications
equipment fell from nearly 7 percent in 2000 to 4.8 percent at the end of 2002.
Real investment in telecommunications structures was ﬂat through most of
the 1990s at approximately $12 billion. Enormous growth occurred in 1999
as investment in structures rose $9 billion in that year alone, to more than $21
billion in the fourth quarter. Such investment has fallen since then to about
$13 billion at the end of 2002.
Telecommunications industry employment (services plus manufacturing)
peakedatapproximately1.59millionworkersinMarch2001.Employmentin
telecom-related industries declined 22 percent—an average annual decrease
of 8 percent—to about 1.30 million by July 2003 (Figure 3 shows services6 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 2 Real Private Fixed Investment in Communications
Equipment and Structures
Source: BEA/Haver
and manufacturing employment separately). Announced ﬁgures for job cuts
have been even more staggering, and media reports have cited numbers of
over 500,000. That is nearly one-third of the sector’s total employment at its
peak. Observed declines in telecom employment have not been as large as
the number of job cuts for two reasons. First, some new jobs were created
even as others were being eliminated. Also, announced job-cut ﬁgures often
include reductions in payroll through attrition, so there may be a signiﬁcant
lag between the announcement of cuts and observed employment declines.
The boom and bust in employment is less dramatic than that in investment
when measured relative to the U.S. economy. As a share of total employment,
telecom employment fell only from 1.2 percent to 1.0 percent from March
2001 to July 2003.
Corporateproﬁtsforthecommunicationsindustrystartedonarapiddown-
wardtrendafter1996.Currentreturnswerenegativefortheyearinwhichtele-
com stocks reached their highest market capitalization. Proﬁts continued to
be negative in 2001, the most recent year for which industry data is available:E.A. Couper, J.P. Hejkal, andA.L. Wolman: Telecom Boom and Bust 7














Notes: Monthly observations. A strike at Verizon accounts for the downward spike in
August 2000.
Source: BLS
the communications industry lost nearly $20 billion in 2001, as seen in Figure
4.
Consumption of telecommunications services grew steadily during the
boom in investment and equity valuations, from approximately $88 billion in
1995 to $151 billion in 2001 in constant 1996 dollars. Telecom consump-
tion’s growth rate rose slightly during the boom—its average year-over-year
growth was 6.7 percent from 1990 to 1995 and was 7.4 percent from 1996 to
2001. Consumption of telecom services grew faster than total consumption
before, during, and after the boom. In 1995, consumption of telecom services
amounted to approximately 1.7 percent of total personal consumption. By
2001, that number was 2.4 percent.
Figure 5 displays price indices for telephone service. Prices for long-
distance telephone service fell 18.5 percent from December 1997 (the earliest
dateavailable)toMarch2003,asmeasuredbytheconsumerpriceindex. Over
the same period, prices for local service rose 21.7 percent. The rise in local8 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 4 Corporate Proﬁts after Tax in the Communications Industry
Source: BEA
service prices is particularly striking when compared with data from earlier
in the 1990s. From January 1990 to January 1997, prices for local service
increased only 8.9 percent. The price index for wireless service fell roughly
32 percent from July 1997 to early 2003, with most of the decline occurring
before 2001.
3. UNDERSTANDING THE BOOMAND BUST
The interaction of technological and regulatory changes goes a long way
toward explaining the behavior of the telecommunications industry at the turn
of the 21st century. Technologies involved in producing telecommunications
services advanced dramatically in the late 1990s, opening the door both to
lower prices for existing services and to the introduction of a plethora of new
services. At the same time, the regulatory environment appeared to be on the
verge of transformation. The telecommunications boom was predicated onE.A. Couper, J.P. Hejkal, andA.L. Wolman: Telecom Boom and Bust 9
Figure 5 Price Indices for Telephone Service
Source: BLS/DRI
technology and regulatory changes interacting propitiously.7 In the event, the
regulatory environment became clouded with uncertainty, undercutting the
virtuous circle scenario on which the telecom boom was based.
With the beneﬁt of hindsight, most people would say that telecommuni-
cations stocks were overvalued at their peak, and that too much investment
took place in the telecommunications sector in the late 1990s. However, any
time there is great uncertainty or rapid change in a market environment, one
should not be surprised, ex post, to observe large forecast errors. Thus, our
explanationforthetelecommunicationsboomandbustdoesnotinvolvefraud,
irrationality, or a bubble. To be sure, as the bust became apparent, fraud did
occur. But it is not clear that fraud played an important role in the boom and
the early stages of the bust.
7 Of course, technological progress was not entirely exogenous. Firms undertook research
and development projects with the expectation of generating future proﬁts.10 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Technology-Related Changes
While the period of the telecommunications boom saw signiﬁcant improve-
ments in technology, many of the basic elements forming the infrastructure
remained the same. Switches and routers form a connection between the
originator of the communication and its destination. Copper wire continues
to connect most consumers to the nearest local switching center. For voice
communication, an analog signal travels to a local switching center, where
the signal is converted to a digital format.8 Switches also direct the signal
toward its destination. Fiber cables known as trunks carry the digital signal
between switches. At some point sufﬁciently near the destination, the signal
is converted back to analog format and directed to its destination in the local
loop via copper wire.9
Fiber has proven to be far superior to copper in its ability to transmit
data. However, the existing infrastructure running into homes and businesses
primarily is made up of copper wire. Consequently, technology that increases
the amount of data that can be carried over copper wire (in particular, digital
subscriber line, or DSL) has been an important part of the development of
telecommunications.
Technologies that increase the capacity of glass ﬁber also have been
important. Thesearguablyhavebeenthemostimpressiveadvancesintelecom-
munications in recent years. In 1996, a strand of ﬁber transmitted data at
approximately 2.5 gigabits per second (Gbps). By 2000, the capacity of the
same ﬁber could reach 100 Gbps.10 This increase in capacity resulted from
developments in “multiplexing,” the transmission of more than one channel
of information over a single medium (Freeman 1999). Instead of 2.5 Gbps
overonewavelength,companiescouldreplicatethisﬂowover40wavelengths
on the same ﬁber. Fiber capacity has since increased further, with equipment
maker Cisco in July, 2002, claiming a maximum capacity of 320 Gbps over
relatively short distances.11
Asimilarchangetookplaceinwirelesscommunications. First-generation
wireless was analog. Digital “second-generation” wireless networks, intro-
duced in 1993, transmitted data at a much faster rate.12 The shift from ﬁrst- to
8Analog signalling uses variations in some physical property such as frequency or amplitude
to transmit information. Digital signals are composed of discrete “on” or “off” units.
9 For further explanation along these lines, see Sharkey’s chapter in the Handbook of Telecom-
munications (2002).
10As a benchmark, a 56-kilobits-per-second (Kbps) dial-up connection is the same as a
0.000056 Gbps connection! To put the ﬁber capacity increase in perspective, compare the in-
crease in capacity to the growth in the speed of integrated circuits, also considered quite rapid.
Whereas the number of transistors per square inch on integrated circuits has doubled roughly ev-
ery 18 months (Moore’s law), ﬁber’s capacity to transmit data doubled approximately every nine
months between 1996 and 2000 (Doms Forthcoming).
11 http://newsroom.cisco.com/dlls/prod 062402d.html
12 Time division multiple access, the ﬁrst second-generation technology, was introduced in
1993. The global system for mobile communication, based on time division multiple access tech-E.A. Couper, J.P. Hejkal, andA.L. Wolman: Telecom Boom and Bust 11
second-generation technology increased the quality and security of the wire-
less network, and consequently increased the substitutability of wireless for
wireline voice communication. Third generation digital wireless, deﬁned by
the International Telecommunications Union to be technologies with rates of
114 Kbps to 2 megabits per second (Mbps), is now widely available in South
Korea. There, the maximum rate of transmission is 153 Kbps, nearly three
times the top capacity of a typical dial-up connection. Tests have shown that
ratesashighas1.8Mbpsarepossible,butthetechnologyhasnotbeendeployed
to consumers.13 Besides the improvements in data capacity, third-generation
technology makes more efﬁcient use of the spectrum, easing the constraints
on areas with dense demand for mobile voice wireless service. However,
third-generation technology is still unavailable in most areas in the United
States, and its prospects for deployment are hampered by its incompatibility
with earlier systems.
Another technological change affecting the telecommunications industry
has been the shift from circuit to packet switching. Historically, voice calls
havebeencircuitswitched,meaningthatanentirecircuit—andthereforeallthe
bandwidth on that circuit—is devoted to a single call end-to-end. Much of the
capacity of the circuit goes unused. Over the past few years, as voice commu-
nicationhasmovedtodigitaltransmissionandswitching,telecommunications
providers are gradually shifting to packet switching. With packet switching,
the voice signal, which is analog by nature, is converted to digital packets of
data. These packets can be transmitted separately to their destination, over
whateverbandwidthisavailable. There,thedataisreassembledandconverted
to sound again. This is the same basic process used for transmission of data
over the Internet. Because bandwidth is distributed as needed, packet switch-
ing leads to more efﬁcient use of available capacity. However, packets can be
delayedorlost. Suchlossesareusuallyinsigniﬁcantfordatatransmission,but
they interfere with the quality of voice calls. Note that voice communication
is transmitted and switched mainly in digital form even when circuit-based
switching is used. Packet-based and circuit-based switching differ in how
the network allocates bandwidth, but neither type handles information in an
analog format—except at the level of the local loop.
If widely disseminated, these advances in basic technology for provid-
ing telecommunications services would have two implications. First, because
the capacity of existing networks would increase dramatically, the price of
existing services would be expected to fall. Second, the increase in capac-
ity, and in speed, would lead to the development of new applications which
nology, is standard in Europe and most of the world. Some major U.S. carriers such as Cingular
use it as well. Code division multiple access, which followed in 1995, is standard in South Korea
and for U.S. carriers such as Verizon.
13 QUALCOMM press release, Nov. 8, 1999. http://www.qualcomm.com/press/pr/releases1999
/press378.html.12 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
beneﬁted from high-speed, high-capacity transmission. To cite one example
that has already been observed, theWorldWideWeb is a telecommunications
application which relied on relatively high-speed modems for its practicality.
Looking ahead, high-quality streaming video is an application that relies on
data transfer speeds greater than are currently available. The interaction be-
tween basic technology (speed and capacity) and new applications represents
avirtuouscircleinwhichnewapplicationsleadtodemandforbandwidth, and
demand for bandwidth provides the impetus for new supply of bandwidth,
which in turn makes new, bandwidth-hungry applications feasible. To a large
extent,beliefintherelevanceofthisinteractionfueledthetelecommunications
boom.
Changes in the Regulatory Environment
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was designed to open up local phone
service to competition. Similar liberalization of long distance in the previous
decade had produced signiﬁcant entry, and hopes were high that the 1996Act
would be equally successful. Prior to the 1996 Act, the telecommunications
sector consisted of highly regulated monopolies in local service, competi-
tive producers (and resellers) of long-distance services, and a large number
of relatively small-scale Internet service providers. The distinctions between
these sectors and between others such as cable were strictly preserved. As of
September 1, 1995, a majority of states allowed competition in switched local
service, but only four states (Illinois, Michigan, NewYork, and Washington)
had any ﬁrms actively competing with the incumbent (Federal Communica-
tions Commission [Fall 1995]). And while the competitive access providers
nearly doubled in size each year in the early 1990s, they accounted for less
than 1 percent of revenues in 1993 (Federal Communications Commission
[Spring 1995]). Meanwhile, the long-distance market had become increas-
ingly competitive. AT&T’s share of long-distance revenues had fallen to 55
percentin1994;MCI,Sprint,andLDDS(WorldCom)togetherhad31percent,
andafringeofsmallercompanies,14percent(FederalCommunicationsCom-
mission [Fall 1995]). By 1995, interstate toll call prices had fallen to roughly
halftheirinﬂation-adjusted1984level(FederalCommunicationsCommission
[Spring 1995]).
The authors of the 1996 Act hoped to promote competition speciﬁcally
in local phone services while maintaining universal service subsidies for
residential users.14 Economides (1999) identiﬁes four crucial regulatory
changes in the 1996Act that were designed to encourage entry.
14 Rural phone customers are more expensive to serve than their counterparts in more densely
populated areas. In the interest of providing phone service to all at the same low prices, “universal
service charges” average the cost over the two groups; the subsidy to rural customers comes at
the expense of urban customers.E.A. Couper, J.P. Hejkal, andA.L. Wolman: Telecom Boom and Bust 13
• Allincumbentswererequiredtosellunbundlednetworkelements(such
as rights to use the copper local loop or access to central ofﬁce equip-
ment) to entrants; the FCC and state utilities commissions would set
the pricing methodology for unbundled network elements.
• Entrants were permitted to purchase at wholesale prices any ILEC
service for resale.
• Incumbents and entrants were required to set reciprocal termination
charges on their networks.
• Regional Bells that faced signiﬁcant competition according to a list of
criteria (the “competitive checklist”) were permitted to enter the long-
distance market.
Other rules pertained to cable, Internet, and long-distance service, but
were not as sweeping (Economides 1999).
WhiletheActclearlyaimedtobringcompetitiontolocaltelephoneservice,
the speciﬁc means of implementation were ambiguous and difﬁcult to inter-
pret. TheAct endowed the FCC with considerable discretion in implementing
the Act’s provisions; the telecoms used a variety of legal tactics to shape the
FCC’s interpretation of the Act. When the FCC’s choices favored entrants,
theincumbentschallengedprovisionsincourt, andviceversawhentheFCC’s
choices favored incumbents. Of course, challenges were typically met with
counter challenges (either by the FCC, state regulators or one segment of
industry), further complicating implementation.
Incumbents challenged the FCC’s rules concerning (1) whether the FCC
had the authority to institute unbundled network element schemes, (2) which
network elements must be unbundled, and (3) what conditions entrants must
satisfy in order to gain access to those elements. A series of court cases
ending with a January 1999 Supreme Court decision established the FCC’s
jurisdiction. InFebruary2003theFCCcompletedrevisedrulesforunbundling
exempting upgraded systems from resale and allowing states to grant further
exemptions, but leaving the unbundled network element platform largely
intact.
Incumbentsandstateutilitiescommissionsfoughtagainstentrantsandthe
FCC over the FCC’s choice of total element long-run incremental cost as the
pricingmethodologyforunbundlednetworkelements. Thispricingschemeis
basedupontheforward-lookingcostfacedbyahypotheticalefﬁcientnetwork,
including “reasonable” proﬁts for the incumbents. Believing that the pricing
methodologywouldnotallowthemtorecapturethecostsoftheirnetwork, the
incumbents challenged the FCC’s pricing order in court. Arguments that the
methodologywascontrarytotheintentofthe1996Actorwasunconstitutional
were rejected by the Supreme Court in May 2002.14 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
The FCC’s 1999 Collocation Order allowed entrants to place necessary
equipmentinincumbents’centralofﬁcesandsetacost-recoverymethodology
for collocation. Incumbents who felt the entrants were given too much access
challengedtheorder,andtheWashington,D.C.CircuitCourtofAppealsissued
a mixed decision in March of 2000. The court agreed with the incumbents
that the deﬁnitions of “necessary” and “physical collocation” were too broad;
however, it approved other features of the Collocation Order, including the
FCC’s cost recovery methodology and a broad deﬁnition of the premises to
which entrants had access (Ryan 2000).
Since 1978, the FCC has set rates for cable and telephone companies that
were able to establish that electric utilities were charging monopoly rents for
therighttostringwiresfromutilitypoles;the1996ActgavetheFCCauthority
to set pole attachment rates for all telecommunications providers. In 1998,
the FCC added cable Internet and wireless attachments to the list of regulated
attachments. The power companies challenged that policy in court, arguing
that because “telecommunications services” did not include cable Internet,
an “information service,” the FCC could not set rates. The Supreme Court
agreed with the FCC that the 1996Act had in fact granted that authority, and
the rules were upheld. Internet access charges, universal service subsidies,
and the competitive checklist, among other things, have also been the cause
of controversy.
The Industry Responds with Boom and Bust
With dramatic changes in basic technology, new products, and the regulatory
environment, it is not surprising that during the period from 1996 to 2002 the
telecommunications sector experienced signiﬁcant volatility. The magnitude
of the volatility, and the fact that it involved a sharp ascent followed immedi-
atelybyasharpdescent, isnonethelessstriking. Someobservershaveblamed
fraud and irrationality for the boom and bust, and others have described the
episode as a bubble. We see the boom and bust as—in large part—a rational
response to the changing fundamentals of technology and regulatory environ-
ment.
Boom
In the wake of the 1996 TelecommunicationsAct, there was tremendous opti-
mism about the eventual opening up of local telephony to competition. With
the local exchange open to competition, all manner of ﬁrms would be free
to compete to be the single provider of a household’s or business’s telecom-
munications services (that is, local, long distance, data, and wireless). It was
expected that the 1996 Act would encourage the competition and innovation
seen in the long-distance market after the breakup ofAT&T in 1984. ServicesE.A. Couper, J.P. Hejkal, andA.L. Wolman: Telecom Boom and Bust 15
would become cheaper for business users especially, and new services would
become available. Writing in May 1996, Dennis R. Patrick, FCC chairman
from 1987 to 1989, expounded the early optimistic view: “The Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996 represents a signiﬁcant milestone. It announces that
the federal government is ﬁnally, largely, out of the way, or at least headed in
that direction. It will usher in an era of radical transformation in the industry
the scope and import of which will make divestiture [of AT&T] look like a
footnote in history” (Patrick 1996).
Early optimism was mitigated somewhat by questions about exactly how
the Act would be implemented, but these questions were expected to be
resolved relatively quickly. Thus, the regulatory uncertainty that existed in
the immediate aftermath of the Act’s passage was a secondary factor; it may
have affected where telecommunications investment was channeled, but did
little to discourage investment in the industry as a whole.
QuestionsabouttheAct’simplementationweremostpressingintheshort-
runfornewentrants, butearlyFCCrulingsandcourtdecisionsseemedtobear
out optimistic assessments of the entrants’ prospects. The pricing method-
ology that the FCC had chosen for unbundled elements was favorable for
entrants, making it appealing for those ﬁrms to compete by leasing at least
some unbundled elements rather than by building entirely separate facilities.
TheSupremeCourt’sJanuary1999decisioninAT&Tvs. IowaUtilitiesBoard
supported the FCC’s authority over pricing, and this was widely interpreted
as a victory for entrants (CLECs). Robert Taylor, chief executive ofﬁcer of
Focal Communications, a Chicago competitive local exchange carrier, called
the decision “great news for CLECs,”15 andWilliam Kennard, FCC chairman
at the time, said that the ruling would create certainty in the industry.16
The competitive local exchange carriers—while relatively small—exper-
ienced a tremendous boom after the Act was passed. From 1996 to 2000
the number of CLECs rose from 30 to 711, and their revenue increased from
less than $5 billion to $43 billion over the same period. From 1996 to 1999
CLECs’marketcapitalizationrosefromabout$3billionto$86billion.17 Over
this same period, however, S&P 500 telecommunications services companies
grew in market capitalization by about $500 billion. Thus, while the growth
rate of the entrants was high by any measure, the increase in their market
capitalization did not account for a large part of the telecom boom.
Investment from 1996 to 2000 was channeled primarily into long-haul
ﬁber optic networks. There were few regulatory barriers to building such net-
works, and the value of these networks was expected to rise for two reasons.
First,asmentionedabove,eventualopeningoflocalexchangestocompetition
15 Quoted in Schmelling (1999).
16 Quoted in Mills (1999).
17 Sources: FCC, Association for Local Telecommunications Services, and Progress and
Freedom Foundation. Cited in Lenard (2002).16 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
would allow owners of such networks to compete to be a single provider; this
was viewed as a prize, particularly if a ﬁrm could attract a large number of
customers.18 Second, Internet use was growing rapidly, and with it the de-
mand for bandwidth was increasing. From 1994 to 1996, trafﬁc on Internet
backbones in the United States is estimated to have grown from 16.3 to 1,500
terabits per month 19(Odlyzko 2002). Rapid growth in demand for bandwidth
was widely forecast to continue as part of the virtuous circle, with new appli-
cations being developed to take advantage of bandwidth as it came online.20
A May 1998 article about Qwest in Wired typiﬁed this view:
Qwest is operating under an if-you-build-it-they-will-come vision. Band-
width restrictions, the company believes, have held back development of
all manner of innovation. Now the prospect of virtually endless through-
put will free up the planet for a host of new applications in such areas
as high-speed video and multimedia. (Diamond 1998)
Spurred by expected increases in demand for bandwidth from the In-
ternet and by the promise of future access to local exchanges, construction
of long-haul ﬁber networks exploded after 1996. Much of this investment
was undertaken by new ﬁrms such as Qwest, Level 3, and IXC. In 1996, the
“old guard” ofAT&T, MCI,WorldCom, and Sprint together accounted for 72
percent of long-haul ﬁber in the United States, but by 1999 they accounted for
only 30 percent of the total. Over this same period, annual ﬁber deployment
increased more than four-fold (Dunay 2000). One of the major producers of
ﬁber was Lucent Technologies. Early in 2000, Lucent was expanding its fa-
cilities to enable it to increase ﬁber output by 60 percent. A Lucent executive
said,“We’veseenﬁbergrowthat17percentforever. Nowwethinkthegrowth
ratewillbe30percentthisyear. There’sanenormousamountofﬁberrequired
to have the penetration needed by long-hauls, cable, and others.”21
One of the mantras of the telecom boom was that Internet use doubles
every three to four months. Many people attribute the origins of the state-
ment to WorldCom (now called MCI) (Dreazen 2002). WorldCom carried
the plurality of Internet trafﬁc for a time, so their reports may have carried
substantial weight (Sidak 2003).22 Even so, the real effects of such a claim
and the extent to which WorldCom should be faulted are hard to establish.
According to research by Kerry Coffman and Andrew Odlyzko (2002), such
growth did in fact occur for a time in 1995 and 1996. They estimate that the
amount of data sent over the Internet has approximately doubled every year
18 This reasoning relies on some form of increasing returns to scale.
19 “A terabit is one trillion bits.”
20 The “virtuous circle” involves complementarity between applications and network capacity.
21 Kuhl (2000). The executive quoted is Tim Cahall.
22 Prior to 1995, the National Science Foundation administered the backbone for the Internet
and kept accurate records of its growth. However, private backbones replaced the government’s
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since then. However, throughout the boom major players outside WorldCom,
such as DuaneAckerman, CEO of BellSouth, continued to assert that Internet
trafﬁc was doubling every 100 days (Calicchio 1999). In addition, although
WorldCom was the biggest carrier, Sprint also carried a large portion of In-
ternet trafﬁc (16 percent to WorldCom’s 37 percent, according to the U.S.
Department of Justice’s announcement that it was suing to block WorldCom
from acquiring Sprint [2000]).
During the boom period, contrarian forecasts of Internet use and the
resulting demand for ﬁber could be heard. Odlyzko has pointed out that
growth rates of 100 percent every three months would have implied that be-
tween 1994 and 2000 Internet use grew by a factor of 17 million (Odlyzko
2002). Forecasts based upon those growth rates and 1994 Internet usage data
have every Internet user in the year 2000 constantly downloading streaming
video. Even admitting that in 1998 no one knew what applications would be
available in 2000, it is difﬁcult not to view this growth rate estimate as ex-
cessively optimistic. In the contrarian view, ﬁber deployment based on such
optimistic forecasts would also be excessive: a May 7, 1999, opinion piece
from the Industry Standard referred to “an unprecedented network overbuild
and a looming glut of bandwidth and connectivity. Precious capital has been
funneledintotoomuchconnectivity,andtoofewsmartapplicationsthatcould
put all this bandwidth to use” (Aguirre and Bruneau 1999).
Pessimistic views regarding the progress in implementing the Act could
also be heard. For example, the view that the Supreme Court’s 1999 decision
would create certainty was not held by all. Writing in the Business Communi-
cations Review, March 1999, Michael Weingarten argued that in the wake of
the January 1999 decision, “matters may be as uncertain as ever” (Weingarten
1999). AsWeingarten noted, the decision settled neither the precise set of un-
bundled elements which incumbents were required to provide, nor the precise
pricing scheme to be used.
In the presence of rapidly changing technologies and market conditions it
isnotsurprisingthattherewasheterogeneityinforecasts. Duringthetelecom-
munications boom, market outcomes evidently reﬂected the optimists more
than the pessimists. Recent research in ﬁnance has suggested that when there
areheterogeneousforecastsassociatedwithneworrapidlychangingtechnolo-
gies, pessimistic voices will have “too small” an effect on the market. These
theories rely on restrictions on taking short positions in stocks. If the distri-
bution of forecasts has a mean at the true expected value, it may nonetheless
be the case that equity prices reﬂect a higher value.23
23 See Ofek and Richardson (2003) and Scheinkman and Xiong (Forthcoming).18 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Bust
Evenin1996,industryobserversdidnotbelievethatcompetitionwouldarrive
overnight in local telecommunications. By late 2000, however, four years had
passed, meaningful competition had not arrived, and implementation of the
1996Act was bogged down in the courts. In addition, the macroeconomy was
weakening, and it was becoming clear that there was signiﬁcant overcapacity
in the long-haul ﬁber market. Together these factors spelled gloom for the
telecommunications sector.
While the competitive local exchange carriers grew extremely fast from
1996to2000,theirshareofthelocaltelephonemarketwasstillsmall,lessthan
8 percent in 2000.24 Furthermore, only about 40 percent of that share com-
prised so-called facilities-based competition, that is, local service provided
by competitors using their own lines rather than by reselling ILEC service or
by purchasing some unbundled elements from incumbents. This strategy left
them particularly exposed to the adverse ruling on the FCC’s pricing method-
ologybytheEighthCircuitCourtofAppealsinIowaUtilitiesBoardvs. FCC,
which in July 2000 moved in the opposite direction from the 1999 decision.
ThemarketcapitalizationofCLECsfell63percentfrom$86.4billionin1999
to $32.1 billion in February of 2001 and then 88 percent to just $3.77 billion
in February of 2002.25 In contrast, the respective market values of two major
ILECs, BellSouth and Qwest, each fell less than 15 percent from March to
December 2000.26 Relative equity valuations, together with the bankruptcy
of many CLECs, suggests that the ILECs’ market power increased after the
Eighth Circuit’s decision. This assessment is supported by the price indices
displayed in Figure 5; the price of local telephone service relative to long-
distance and wireless rose noticeably after July 2000.
On March 10, 2000, the Nasdaq telecom index peaked at 1,230.06; by the
endof2000ithadfallenby62percent. Withhindsight,itisclearthat2000was
the year in which the telecommunications industry began its sharp decline. If
anything, this decline was especially pronounced in the long-haul ﬁber seg-
ment. However, industry observers did not generally catch this development
before late 2000. Early in 2000, we saw that Lucent was optimistic about
demand for ﬁber, and even as share prices had begun to fall, in September of
2000 Broadband Week published an article with the headline, “Future Looks
Bright for Fiber Optic Manufacturers.” It soon became apparent, though, that
there was massive overcapacity in long-haul ﬁber. Media reports of the glut
in long-haul ﬁber became widespread early in 2001. In an article titled “The
24 FCC, cited in Crandall (2002).
25Association for Local Telecommunications Services, and Progress and Freedom Foundation.
Cited in Lenard (2002).
26 Large mergers completed in 2000 greatly increased the market value of the other two
ILECs, SBC and Verizon (formed from Bell Atlantic and GTE).E.A. Couper, J.P. Hejkal, andA.L. Wolman: Telecom Boom and Bust 19
Coming Bandwidth Bubble Burst,” Grahame Lynch wrote in America’s Net-
work,February1,2001,“It’sthepainphaseforAmerica’sﬁberbarons. Nearly
600,000 miles of new inter-city ﬁber is on the way. Capacity prices are drop-
ping and major dot.com and CLEC customers are failing.” And by June 2001,
when Canadian equipment producer Nortel announced a $19 billion quarterly
loss,thebustwascleartoall. Compoundingtheproblemsthatwerespeciﬁcto
the telecommunications sector, the U.S. economy weakened over the course
of2000,withtheNationalBureauofEconomicResearcheventuallydeclaring
that a recession had begun in March 2001. This broad decline in economic
activity coincided with the regulatory turmoil to send the industry into a sharp
decline in 2000 and 2001, from which it still may not have emerged.
Overcapacity in long-haul ﬁber had three sources. First, the long-haul
ﬁber industry was in its early stages, and it is typical in the evolution of an
industry to see an initial overshooting of investment, followed by a shakeout
period(Klepper2002). Second,thedramaticincreaseinthecapacityofagiven
strand of ﬁber may have been greater than anticipated when construction on
various networks was begun (Sidak 2003, 216). Third, and perhaps most
importantly, demand for long-haul ﬁber capacity had not grown as fast as
many had forecast: the pessimists turned out to be right.
Aboveweexplainedtheforecastsofhighgrowthindemandforbandwidth
as being based on the positive interaction between increases in bandwidth and
the development of new applications to soak up that bandwidth. This inter-
action did occur; as average bandwidth to households has increased (mainly
through digital subscriber line and cable broadband), it has become increas-
ingly common for music to be disseminated over the Internet. However, the
magnitude of increases in demand for bandwidth has been small compared
to the forecasts embedded in equity valuations and investment numbers. The
optimistic forecasts seem to have been based on a much wider adoption of
ﬁber-to-the-home than actually occurred. Because the 1996Act’s implemen-
tation has been bogged down in the courts, neither ILECs or CLECs have
undertaken large-scale investments in ﬁber-to-the-home, and thus bottlenecks




are contracting. The behavior of the telecommunications sector since 1996 is
particularly interesting because the magnitudes are so great. The decrease in
market capitalization of S&P telecommunications ﬁrms alone from 2000 to
2002 was roughly $700 billion, more than 3.5 percent of the entire value of
U.S. corporate equities at the stock market peak in 2000.20 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
According to our analysis, the 1996 TelecommunicationsAct was an im-
portant factor in both the boom and the bust. High hopes for a new world of
competition in telecommunications followed passage of theAct, and played a
major role in the dramatic rise in equity valuations. Even as the boom was ef-
fectively over, in February 2000, then FCC ChairmanWilliam Kennard spoke
of“themiracleoftheAmericanmodelforunleashingcompetitionintelecom-
munications,” competition that was “creating unprecedented investment and
jobgrowthineverysectorofthecommunicationsindustry.”27 Twoyearslater,
with the bust apparent to all, Kennard’s successor Michael Powell described
it in a speech as “an unbelievable disaster,” and did not hesitate to assign
some of the blame to “legal instability in the court system.” Referring to the
TelecommunicationsAct of 1996, Powell said
I have rarely seen a 750,000-word document come out of the United
States Congress with clarity, and I have rarely seen one that long and
complex that isn’t going to trigger years of uncertainty and litigation
about the parameters of that statute. I was always sort of amazed by the
degree to which people didn’t have that expectation built into the way
things would go.28
Ofcourse, somepeopledidhavethatexpectationbuiltintotheirforecasts,
but market valuations were more optimistic. We do not have a deﬁnitive
explanation for the market’s valuations. However, theories of asset pricing in
thepresenceofheterogeneousbeliefsandrestrictionsonshortsalesimplythat
asset valuations will be driven by the market’s optimists. Optimism about the
fundamentals of the telecom sector was widespread during the boom years,
leading us to be skeptical about claims that there was a bubble in telecom
stocks.
Inadditiontothe1996Act,technologicaladvancesintelecommunications
also played important roles in both the boom and the bust. Investment in
long-haul ﬁber was predicated on the idea that as-yet-unknown applications
would be developed to take advantage of the new bandwidth. Failure of those
applications to materialize at the rate that had been predicted translated into
a capacity glut, and the glut was exacerbated by the dramatic advances in
technology for increasing the capacity of each strand of ﬁber.
While our analysis of the telecommunications boom and bust has merely
touchedthesurfaceofthisissue,wedocomeawaywithtworecommendations
for policymakers. First, they should take seriously the idea that lack of clarity
in the regulatory framework under which an industry operates can lead to
substantial volatility in that industry. Our second recommendation is related
27 Speech to National Press Club, February 8, 2000.
28 Remarks of Michael K. Powell, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, at the
Thomas Weisel Partners Growth Forum 4.0, Santa Barbara, California, June 17, 2002.E.A. Couper, J.P. Hejkal, andA.L. Wolman: Telecom Boom and Bust 21
to the mantra or myth of Internet trafﬁc doubling every three months. While
we are skeptical of the extent to which irrational belief in such growth rates
drove the telecom boom, it is clear that good aggregate data on Internet use
was difﬁcult, if not impossible, to acquire after 1994. The federal government
is involved in many data collection efforts, and the data it collects are viewed
as a public good. With the beneﬁt of hindsight, collection and dissemination
of data on Internet use would have been a productive activity for the U.S.
government to be involved in during this period, and will be in the future.29
There is much room for future work on the telecom boom and bust. Here
wementionjusttwoareasofinterest. First, whiletelecommunicationsexperi-
enced particularly extreme ﬂuctuations from 1996 to 2002, other sectors also
rose and fell, as did the U.S. economy as a whole. Biotechnology, in particu-
lar, experienced ﬂuctuations of nearly the same magnitude as telecom, though
the spike in biotech was very brief and came toward the end of the telecom
boom. A comparative study of biotech and telecom might be revealing about
the causes of the ﬂuctuations in both sectors. Second, there have been other
episodes of sectoral booms and busts in the history of the United States, and
onethatimmediatelyinvitescomparisonwithtelecomistherailroadboomand
bust of the 1870s. Like telecommunications, railroads consist of networks,
and a comparative study of these episodes would shed light on the question of
whether network industries are particularly prone to large ﬂuctuations.30
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